Number Stations are back – Spring 2025 update

Introduction

Number stations are clandestine radio broadcasts made up of seemingly random numbers, letters, or Morse‑code groups transmitted on short‑wave frequencies. First employed widely during the Cold War, these one‑way broadcasts enabled intelligence services to communicate securely with operatives in the field. Recent open‑source evidence (2024–2025) indicates that number stations are active once again, deployed by Russia, China, and even NATO‑aligned countries. This report explains how number stations operate, their Cold‑War history, and the renewed activity observed in the past two years.

Historical Context: Cold War‑Era Number Stations

Beginning in the late 1940s, dozens of short‑wave transmitters started broadcasting monotonous voices reading five‑digit groups or coded words. By the 1960s and 1970s, “numbers” traffic blanketed the HF spectrum, serving both Eastern‑Bloc and Western agencies.

“Lincolnshire Poacher.” An English‑language station believed to have been run by Britain’s MI6 from an RAF base in Cyprus. Its signature folk tune alerted agents before numbers were read aloud. Gizmodo
Soviet & Warsaw‑Pact stations. Numerous Russian, East‑German, and Cuban services broadcast encrypted messages throughout the Cold War. An internal Polish intelligence study in the 1950s noted West‑German transmissions aimed at Bloc agents. Wikipedia

How Number Stations Work: Transmission & Encryption

Figure: A vintage short‑wave receiver—ordinary civilian equipment a field agent could use.

Frequency band. HF/short‑wave (3–30 MHz) signals reflect off the ionosphere, travelling thousands of kilometres with modest power. War on the Rocks
Format. A brief interval signal (tune or tones) precedes a voice or digital burst reading groups of numbers, phonetic letters, or Morse code.
Encryption. Virtually all stations employ one‑time pad (OTP) ciphers—mathematically unbreakable if pads are never reused. After copying the ciphertext, an agent subtracts matching pad numbers to reveal the plaintext order. Gizmodo
Operational advantages. A short‑wave receiver is passive (receive‑only) and leaves no electronic trail. Signals are hard to jam over large areas, giving agencies a resilient, anonymous channel.

The Strategic Role of Number Stations in the Cold War

One‑way voice links (OWVLs) proved indispensable for directing covert operations.

CIA/MI6 Baltic missions (1945‑56). Western agents infiltrating Soviet territories carried short‑wave sets and OTPs—many were captured when the KGB “played back” their radios to entrap teams. War on the Rocks
Operation Solo (1960s). FBI intercepts proved Moscow transmitted coded radiograms to U.S. operatives. War on the Rocks
Cuban Five (2001). A Cuban spy ring was convicted after prosecutors introduced recordings of the Spanish‑language “¡Atención!” station and decrypted OTP traffic. War on the Rocks

Post‑Cold War Continuation & Evolution

Although several prominent services fell silent after 1991, many persisted or re‑emerged:

Russian illegals (2010) & German couple (2013). Both cases involved receiving HF radiograms from Moscow.
Cuba’s HM01. Still active today, blending spoken numbers with digital RDFT file bursts.
Poland’s E11 “Oblique.” Daily English transmissions continue in 2025, attributed to Agencja Wywiadu. Priyom E11 Profile

Contemporary Developments (2024–2025)

Russia – UVB‑76 (“The Buzzer”)

Long‑running station on 4625 kHz. On 11 December 2024 it issued 24 voice messages in a single day—the most in its recorded history—during heightened Ukraine operations. Meduza

China & East Asia

Taiwan’s V13 “Star Star.” Mandarin numbers aired from Taiwan to agents on the mainland. Wikipedia
PRC military HF networks. Stations labelled VC01/VC03 and high‑speed Morse (M87/M89) believed to carry PLA traffic; hobbyists noted unusual coded bursts on 9412 kHz in April 2024.

NATO & Western Allies

Besides Poland’s E11, Western militaries broadcast HF Emergency Action Messages (EAMs)—letter/number strings for nuclear‑command forces. A 2022 U.S. Naval Institute paper urged reviving number‑station tactics for future contested environments. USNI Proceedings

Open‑Source Monitoring & OSINT Evidence

Enthusiast groups such as Enigma 2000, Priyom.org, and the Spooks mailing list continuously log schedules, frequencies, and message bursts. Their databases document spikes that correlate with geopolitical crises—e.g., increased Russian traffic before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Conclusion

Number stations exemplify a paradox of modern espionage: sometimes the simplest technology is the most secure. They require no local infrastructure, are inherently anonymous, and employ an unbreakable OTP cipher. In an era of pervasive cyber‑intrusion, the crackle of HF static remains an irresistible option for intelligence services. From Russia’s buzzing transmitters to NATO’s quiet contingency channels, the clandestine numbers echo once more across the ionosphere in 2025.